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SPOUSAL INTEREST IN PROFESSIONAL
DEGREES: SOLVING THE COMPENSATION
DILEMMA
When faced with the problem of a marriage dissolution in
which the couple's only notable marital asset consists of a profes-
sional degree, courts disagree over the proper treatment of this
asset) The situation usually involves a wife 2
 putting her husband
through professional school by providing financial, emotional and
domestic support, and foregoing her own career goals to further
her spouse's educational goals. 3
 Dissolution of the marriage occurs
just prior to, or fairly soon after, the student spouse obtains the
degree, frustrating the supporting spouse's expectations of a higher
standard of living.4
Due to the high cost of the education pursued, the couple,
upon divorce, has few marital assets aside from the degree The
problem is that the working spouse is, by definition, capable of self-
support and may be left without compensation upon divorce. 6 If
the marriage is of a relatively long duration in which the contrib-
uting spouse has enjoyed the higher standard of living from the
professional degree for many years, most courts have agreed that
considering the contribution to the degree is not proper. These
courts reason that the contributing spouse has already reaped the
benefits of the support, and the higher standard of living will be
reflected in alimony payments.' When the marriage is of a short
duration, however, the working spouse has presumably not bene-
fitted from his or her contribution.
See generally, Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty Stales: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q.
331 (1986).
2
 An overwhelming majority of the cases on point involve the male as the professional
degree holder. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 736 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. 1987) (en bane); Geer v. Geer,
84 N.C, App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987); St.-Pierre v. St.-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.
1984).
3 Olar v. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo. 1987).
4 Id.
5
 Comment, The EquitylProperty Dilemma: Analyzing The Working Spouse's Contributions To
The Other's Educational Degree At Divorce, 23 Hous. L. REV. 991, 993 (1986) [hereinafter
Comment, The Equity,Property Dilemma].
6 Id,
7 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 201-02, 741 S,W.2d 640, 645 (1987); Sweeney
v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Me. 1987); Davey v. Davey, 415 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988).
749
750	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:749
This note focuses on the issue of spousal interest in professional
degrees for spouses who have contributed to attaining the degree
but who have not yet reaped any of the benefits. Section one of this
note discusses the case law that has developed on this issue, 8 and
the possible alternative solutions that courts have used when faced
with the problem of compensating the supporting spouse. 9 Section
two of this note then analyzes recent cases that have been decided
regarding the issue of a spouse's interest in the other's professional
degree.'° The note concludes, in section three, with a recommen-
dation that the best solution to the problem is to recognize that the
degree should not be considered marital property. Rather, the sup-
porting spouses should be reimbursed for their efforts by receiving
the amount of support contributed to the attainment of the degree .
plus interest, and also possibly a rehabilitative award to compensate
the working spouse for viable lost opportunity costs."
1. THEORIES OF COMPENSATION
The majority of states that have decided the issue have deter-
mined that a professional degree or license' 2 is not marital
property" for the court to distribute upon dissolution of the mar-
riage." Courts have also maintained, however, that equity demands
sonic compensation to the supporting spouse." Many courts have
relied on the nonproperty characteristics of an educational degree
in making their determination. 16
8 See infra notes 12-23 and acompanying text.
9 See infra notes 24-85 and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 86-151 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 132-150 and accompanying text.
' 2 This note uses the terms "license" and "degree" interchangeably.
" See infra note 98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference between
classifying something as "marital property" and the awarding of alimony.
i 4 See, e.g., Olar v. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987); In re Marriage of Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 111. App. 3d 234,
470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (1984); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080
(1985); Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 246, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1987); Davey v. Davey,
415 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 505, 453 A.2d
.527,•536 (1982); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 120, 492 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1986);
Pacht v. Jadd, 13 Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918, 921 (1983); Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa.
264, 268, 520 A.2d 15, 17 (1986); Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 75 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), cert. granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 474 (W. Va.
1988); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984).
15 Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 246-47, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1987); Martinez v.
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 477 (W. Va.
1988).
18 See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). The Graham
court stated that:
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Only one state's highest court, New York, has determined that
the professional degree is marital property. t7 In O'Brien v. O'Brien,
the New York Court of Appeals held that a license to practice
medicine, acquired during marriage, was marital property subject
to equitable distribution.' 8
Courts that have determined that the degree is not marital
property have nevertheless held that the student spouse must com-
pensate the supporting spouse for his or her efforts."' The question
remains, however, as to what form this compensation should take.
Courts have recognized a variety of compensatory alternatives, 20
including compensation by alimony:2 ' compensation by restitution, 22
and compensation through reimbursement."
A. Compensation Through Traditional Alimony Payments
Although courts generally determine spousal maintenance
awards based on monetary need and not to "achieve financial parity"
between the spouses, many courts have used alimony to compensate
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even by
the broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an exchange
value or any objective transferrable value on an open market. It is personal to
the holder. It terminates upon death of the holder and is not inheritable. It
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in
the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
Id.
°O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985). For
lower courts that have also held that the professional degree is marital property, see Daniels
v. Daniels, 165 Mich. App. 726, 731, 418 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1988); Thomas v. Thomas, 164
Mich. App. 618, 620, 417 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1984); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich,
App. 258, 261-62, 337 N.W,2d 332, 334 (1983).
"'O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y,S.2d at 744.
19 See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a discussion of compensation to the
supporting spouse.
"See Gailor & McGill, The Equitable Distribution of Professional Degrees Upon Divorce In
North Carolina, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 69, 72 (1987).
21 1d. at 82 (citing 1985 Survey of Family Law, 11 Fast. L. REV. 3015, 3017-18 (1985)) (23
States have allowed "rehabilitative maintenance"). See e.g., Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473,
478 (W. Va. 1988).
22 See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 208 (1982); Bold v. Bold,
374 Pa, Super. 317, 542 A.2d 1374, 1379 (1988).
" See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 503, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (1982); Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 478.
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a working spouse who has helped the student spouse obtain a
professional degree." Courts may award either reimbursement or
rehabilitative alimony. Reimbursement alimony may be awarded to
a spouse who has given financial support to his or her partner to
obtain a professional degree with the expectation of deriving future
benefits for both partners." Conversely, some state courts have
granted alimony for rehabilitation only, not reimbursement." Re-
habilitative alimony is support given to a spouse who may have
postponed a career or foregone the pursuit of an education. 27
 The
award is "intended merely to enable that spouse, through further
education and training, to re-enter the job market and become
independent.""
1. Reimbursement Alimony
Reimbursement is an adjustment designed to repay the sup-
porting spouse for financial contributions made toward the attain-
ment of the student spouse's degree. 29 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in 1982, espoused the concept of reimbursement alimony in
Mahoney v. Mahoney. 3° In Mahoney, the court introduced the concept
of reimbursement (alimony) to compensate the supporting spouse
who shared the mutual expectation that both parties would derive
increased income and material benefits from the degree." The
Mahoney court decided that the supporting spouse had contributed
all financial support for the two years during which the student
spouse obtained an M.B.A." Although the court concluded that the
degree was not marital property subject to division," the court
noted that in proper circumstances, reimbursement alimony is ap-
propriate." The Mahoney court emphasized the unfairness of deny-
ing the supporting spouse the anticipated benefits from the degree
while the student spouse is left not only with the degree, but with
24 See Gailor & McGill, supra note 20, at 82.
2" Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
26 See Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 272, 520 A.2d 15, 19 (1986).
27 See Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 479 (W. Va. 1988).
2"
 Katz, Equitable Distribution in Massachusetts, 6 MASS. FAM. L.J. 25, 34 (1988).
2" Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 477 (W. Va. 1988).
" Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 527.
" Id. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
32 Id. at 492, 453 A.2d at 529.
" Id. at 505, 453 A.2d at 536.
34 Id. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
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all the monetary awards associated therewith." The court noted
that the working spouse has typically suffered a loss or reduction
of support, undergone a lower standard of living during the mar-
riage, made financial sacrifices, and finally, been deprived of a
higher standard of living in the future. 36
All courts that have dealt with the situation agree that if the
marriage is of long duration, no reimbursement is necessary because
the supporting spouse has enjoyed a higher standard of living from
the degree and this inevitably would be reflected in the alimony
payments." In Gardner v. Gardner, the Supreme Court of Utah
reasoned that because the Gardners had been married for over
twenty years and had other significant assets aside from the degree,
it was not an appropriate situation to award the wife a property
interest in Dr. Gardner's medical degree." The court stated that
this would be fair to Mrs. Gardner because she had received the
benefits from the degree through higher alimony payments and
through the increased property settlement. 39
Some courts, however, have criticized redistributing the value
of the degree through alimony payments. The reimbursement ali-
mony approach was criticized by a later New Jersey case, Reiss v.
Reiss, because the court viewed the concepts of alimony (future
support), and reimbursement (for past payments), as inconsistent
and inapposite.° The New York Court of Appeals in O'Brien v.
O'Brien, criticized the alimony approach to compensation because
alimony payments end upon remarriage and a working spouse who
remarries is penalized by having to forfeit the compensation still
owed for his or her contribution to the degree. 4 ' Despite these
criticisms, courts have continued to use the reimbursement alimony
theory advocated in Mahoney as a means of reimbursing a support-
ing spouse for the monetary contributions he or she made to the
professional spouse's training. 42
." Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533-34.
"Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 534.
37 See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a similar discussion of this point.
' 0 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988).
3° Id.
4°
 Reiss v. Reiss, 205 N.J. Super. 41, 500 A.2d 24, 27 (1985). See also Gailor & McGill,
supra note 20, at 83.
4 ' O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 587, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748
(1985).
43 Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W. Va. 1988).
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2. Rehabilitative Alimony
A second way of using the alimony system to compensate is to
provide for rehabilitation of a contributing spouse through in-
creased alimony payments. When the supporting spouse has fore-
gone his or her own career opportunities or postponed his or her
education, some courts have found rehabilitative alimony to be
appropriate." In Hoak v. Hoak, a 1988 decision, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, although determining that a profes-
sional degree is not marital property,'" held that Rebecca Hoak may
be entitled to rehabilitative alimony." The Hoaks had been married
for four years, during which Bruce Hoak obtained a medical degree
and Rebecca had postponed obtaining a degree in either education
or accounting." The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that
rehabilitative alimony is appropriate when a spouse comes into the
marriage with employable skills that have deteriorated through lack
of use or when the spouse could become independent through
training or education. 47
The awarding of rehabilitative alimony to compensate a spouse
who postpones his or her education, however, is not without its
critics. The New York Court of Appeals had earlier criticized this
theory as inadequate for the purpose of compensation, because of
the common requirement that the alimony award be based on
need." By definition, the supporting spouse will have difficulty
fulfilling this requirement as he or she has supported the couple
for the years during which the degree was obtained and therefore
has shown his or her capability of self-support." In addition, the
O'Brien court noted that the function of equitable distribution upon
the termination of a marriage is premised on the notion that each
spouse has a right to share in the marital assets accumulated during
the marriage.5° The share is not based on need, but on the notion
that the property accumulated is the result of what was essentially
a partnership. 5 ' The O'Brien court reasoned that, unlike alimony,
45
 Id. at 479.
" Id. at 474.
45 Id. at 479.
46 Id. at 474.
47 Id, at 479 (quoting Cross v. Cross, 368 5.E.2d 449, 451 (W. Va. 1987)).
48 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.5.2d at 748.
49 See Comment, The EquilyIPraperty Dilemma, supra note 5, at 993.
5° O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49 (citing Wood
v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1983).
"Id.
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which is based on need and an obligation of the spouse for future
care, the supporting spouse is entitled to a share of the proceeds
from the degree earned because it is his or her "property" and
neither remarriage nor lack of need should affect that ownership
right.
B. Compensation by Restitution
Under the theory of compensation through restitution, the
supporting spouse must show that the student spouse, by acquiring
the degree during the marriage, was unjustly enriched at the sup-
porting spouse's expense." The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
a recent decision, Bold v. Bold, espoused this viewpoint." Richard
and Nancy Bold were married in 1974, at which time Nancy had a
bachelor degree and Richard had completed a few years of college."
From 1974 to 1976, Richard Bold attended college and from 1976
to 1979, he attended chiropractic school. While in school, Richard
earned approximately $16,000 per year at various jobs and received
Veterans Administration educational benefits. During the marriage
Nancy Bold earned approximately $80,000. Although Richard was
in school, the couple enjoyed a fairly high standard of living during
that period, partaking in various vacations and trips.
Following the standards set forth in a previous Pennsylvania
decision, 55 the court noted that marriage is not a business relation-
ship "which requires a strict economic accounting for all financial
aid rendered during its course." 56 The court stated that each spouse
owes a duty of support to the other, and reasoned that a student
spouse is liable to reimburse the supporting spouse only for money
advanced in excess of the legal duty of support that the law im-
poses. 57 The court then said that in most cases this excess would be
the financial amount contributed to the cost of the student spouse's
education. 58 The court denied Nancy Bold restitution because she
had not contributed to the cost of Richard Bold's academic degree.
Although she worked and supported him during his schooling, her
52 See Gailor & McGill, supra note 20, at 89.
" 542 A.2d 1374, 11379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (wife not entitled to compensation for
support contributed to husband's chiropractor degree).
54 Id. at 1375.
"Id. at 1378 (citing Lehtnicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985)).
"Id. at 1379.
57 Id,
" Id.
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contributions did not exceed that which she was lawfully required
to give for the benefit of the family."
A minority of jurisdictions have used restitution as a form of
compensation." The distinction between reimbursement and resti-
tution is that reimbursement allows a straight repayment of the
financial contribution and foregone income, and restitution gives
the supporting spouse the amount of his or her contribution plus
interests'
C. The Degree as Marital Property—Compensation Through Division
A minority of jurisdictions, New York and some Michigan ap-
peals courts, have held that the professional degree or license is
marital property subject to division upon dissolution of the mar-
riage.62 These courts hold that reimbursement is not sufficient com-
pensation and that if the degree is property, then it is more equitable
for the supporting spouse to receive a portion of its value rather
than "a return of funds advanced.""
In O'Brien v. O'Brien, the New York Court of Appeals held that
a license to practice medicine, acquired during marriage, was mar-
ital property subject to equitable distribution." In O'Brien, the wife
supported her husband in both completing his undergraduate de-
gree and in obtaining a medical degree.65 She even moved to Guad-
alajara, Mexico for him to pursue his medical degree. 66 Dr. O'Brien
commenced divorce proceedings within two months after obtaining
his license to practice medicine. 67 The court stated that the value of
a professional license, as marital property, was the enhanced earn-
ing capacity it afforded the holder," and the spouse who worked
during the holder's schooling was entitled to an equitable portion
of the license, not a return of funds advanced. 69 The court based
59
 Id.
60 See Gailor & McGill, supra note 20, at 87. See also, Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346,
357, 661 P.2d 196, 208 (1982).
61 See Gailor & McGill, supra note 20, at 88.
62 See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the professional degree
as marital property.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 588, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749
(1985).
" Id. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
65 Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
66 Id., 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
67 Id., 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
" Id. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
69 Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
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its reasoning on section 236(B)(1)(6) of the New York Domestic
Relations Law, which allowed the court to so determine." That
section provided that the court, in distributing marital property,
should consider contributions made to the career of a spouse."
In the 1988 case of Daniels v. Daniels, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had erred in not awarding a portion
of the degree's value to the plaintiff. 72 In Daniels-, the couple was
married in 1974 while the defendant was in college and the plaintiff
was eighteen years old." The two agreed that the defendant would
pursue his education to become a dentist while the plaintiff sup-
ported the couple, and then the plaintiff would eventually go to
college and finally law school. 74 During the time the defendant was
pursuing his degrees, the plaintiff worked full time. At the time of
trial, the plaintiff was twenty-nine years old and had not yet at-
tended school. 75
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff
had not only worked to support the defendant in his endeavor but
had foregone her own education in the process. 76 The court stated
that the attainment of the degree resulted from the "joint effort"
of the parties and was not the student's "individual project."" In
rejecting the arguments set forth by the majority of courts as to
why the degree should not be considered marital property, the
Court of Appeals of Michigan relied on its previous holding in the
1983 case, Woodworth v. Woodworth, that whether a degree fits the
"definition" of property is irrelevant." The Woodworth court also
said that although marriage is not intrinsically a commercial enter-
" Id. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. The O'Brien court noted
that:
Section 236 provides that in making an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty, the court shall consider: * * * (6) any equitable claim to, interest in or
direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property
by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and con-
tributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and
to the career or career potential of the other party [and] * * * (9) the impossibility
or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business,
corporation or profession,
Id. (quoting N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (8)(5)(d)(6), (9) (1982)) (emphasis added by court).
71 Id., 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
72 Daniels v. Daniels, 165 Mich. App. 726, 731, 418 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1988).
"Id, at 728, 418 N.W.2d at 925.
74
m Id. at 728, 418 N.W.2d at 926.
" Id. at 731, 418 N.W.2d at 927.
" Id., 418 N.W.2d at 927.
7" Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261-62, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983).
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prise, and neither party would expect compensation for his or her
efforts, the court did not need to characterize the marriage while it
was still intact, but instead must distribute the assets of the marriage
once it had terminated.'`'
When distributing assets of a failed marriage, it is especially
difficult for courts to assign a value to the professional degree. The
New York Court of Appeals held, in O'Brien, that the value of a
degree was the enhanced earning capacity it afforded the holder.
The O'Brien court stated that although finding the present value of
this figure presented problems, it is no more difficult than com-
puting tort damages for wrongful death and diminished earning
capacity." The court offered some guidance to the trial courts faced
with this issue by suggesting that they consider such factors as the
supporting spouse's need for an immediate or even lump sum
payment, the student spouse's ability to pay, and any possible tax
consequences of postponing the payment periods'
The Michigan Court of Appeals offered further guidance in
1987. The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Thomas v. Thomas, enum-
erated three factors to consider in determining the percentage share
of the value that should belong to the supporting spouse. These
factors included the length of the marriage after obtainment of the
degree, the extent of financial support given to the student spouse
during his or her years in school, and the overall division of the
parties' marital assets."
Criticism of the awarding of the degree as property has cen-
tered around the speculative nature of deciding a professional's
future earnings." The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
in Hoak, pointed out that holding that the degree is property could
force a young professional into a career path he or she might not
otherwise have chosen but for the financial pressure to pay half of
the "value" of the degree to the spouse. 84 The Hoak court also
observed that the efforts of the student spouse produce the degree
and that the support provided by the working spouse, whether
79 1d. at 265, 337 N.W.2d at 356.
6° See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 588, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
749 (1988).
BS Id.
82 Thomas v. Thomas, 164 Mich. App. 618, 625, 417 N.W.2d 563, 566 (1987) (citing
Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 260-61, 357 N.W.2d at 337).
99 See Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 476 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at 477 n.4.
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financial, emotional or domestic, has no relation to the value of the
degree.85
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS PosrrioN AND OTHER RECENT CASES
A. State of the Law in Massachusetts
Massachusetts has followed the majority of courts in holding
that a professional degree is not marital property. In 1987, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Drapek v. Drapek, held
that a professional degree and the resulting increase in earning
capacity are not in themselves a marital asset of the husband's estate
under the Massachusetts equitable distribution statute. 86 Mark and
Celia Drapek were married for eight years." During that time, Mark
as
	 at 477.
m 399 Mass. 240, 246, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1987). MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 (as
amended 1989) provides:
Upon divorce or upon a complaint in an action brought at any time after a
divorce, whether such a divorce has been adjudged in this commonwealth or
another jurisdiction, the court of the commonwealth, provided there is personal
jurisdiction over both parties, may make a judgment for either of the parties to
pay alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony,
the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of
the other. In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing
the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court, after
hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the
marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employa-
bility, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. When the court makes
an order for alimony on behalf of a spouse, said court shall determine whether
the obligor under such order has health insurance or other health coverage
available to him through an employer or organization or has health insurance
or other health coverage available to him at reasonable cost that may be ex-
tended to cover the spouse fir whom support is ordered. When said court has
determined that the obligor has such insurance, said court shall include in the
support order a requirement that the obligor exercise the option of additional
coverage in favor of such spouse, obtain coverage for the spouse, or reimburse
the spouse for the cost of health insurance. In no event shall the order for
alimony be reduced as a result of the obligor's cost for health insurance coverage
for the spouse. When said court has determined that the obligor has such
insurance, said court shall include in the support order a requirement that the
obligor exercise the option of additional coverage in favor of such spouse.
Id.
The only Massachusetts court to interpret this statute previously on this issue ruled that
an orthodontia license was marital property subject to division upon dissolution of the
marriage. Reen v. Reen, Mass Probate and Family Ct. Hampden Div. (December 23, 1981).
" Drape*, 399 Mass. at 241, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
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obtained his medical degree while Celia postponed her educational
and professional plans" to support the household and provide most
of the domestic homemaking services. 89 The couple used the joint
funds of the marriage to pay Mark's medical school tuition." Upon
divorce, Mark was a senior resident in internal medicine at Univer-
sity Hospital in Boston, while Celia retained temporary employment
with New England Telephone as a service representative.
The trial court determined that during the marriage, Celia's
financial contribution exceeded Mark's by $8,534. The lower court
judge also found that one half of the tuition, plus the amount by
which Celia's financial contribution exceeded that of Mark's, con-
stituted the excess financial contribution that she, as the supporting
spouse, had contributed to the marriage. The judge found this
amount to be $22,024.50. In order for Celia to rehabilitate her job
skills and also to receive appropriate compensation, the lower court
judge decided that she was entitled to a portion of Mark's increased
earning capacity until she became rehabilitated and self-sufficient. 91
The judge, therefore, ordered Mark to pay Celia $42,024.50;
$22,024.50 because of her excess financial contribution and $20,000
as the value of the homemaking services she contributed. 92 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in reviewing the Drapek de-
cision, held that Mark's medical degree and enhanced earning ca-
pacity were not part of his estate, and any assignment of such was
error." The Supreme Judicial Court also held that because they
had no way of determining the effect of this error in calculating
the alimony awarded, the award of alimony must be set aside and
the issue remanded. 94
The Drapek court refused to hold that the present value of
future earned income was subject to division under Massachusetts
General Laws, chapter 208, section 34 because to do so would have
involved too much speculation." The statute authorizes the distri-
bution of property upon divorce according to twelve mandatory
and two discretionary factors." The Drapek court reasoned that
88 Id. at 248, 503 N.E.2d at 951.
89 Id. at 241, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
9° Id.
91 Id. at 242, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
92 Id.
95 Id. at 246, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 244, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
98 See Katz, supra note 28, at 28.
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adopting a rule that would subject the degree's value to distribution
upon divorce would eliminate consideration of the effect of future
events on the professional's earning capacity. 97 The Drapek court
was concerned about the ramifications of future events because,
unlike alimony, a property settlement is not subject to modifica-
tio n . 98
The Drapek court also refused to include a professional degree
as a marital asset under the Massachusetts equitable distribution
statute because assigning a present value to a professional degree
would involve evaluating the speculative earning potential of the
holder." In distinguishing the conclusion of the New York Court
of Appeals in O'Brien, the Drapek court pointed out that the O'Brien
decision was based on a statute in which the New York court found
a clear legislative mandate to determine that the professional degree
is marital property." The court noted that Massachusetts General
Laws, chapter 208, section 34 contains no such invitation.m
The Drapek court, however, went on to say that the statute was
sufficiently broad to allow consideration of the increased earning
potential from the degree in determining an alimony award and
the assignment of the parties' estates.' 92 Therefore, the court fol-
lowed the majority of jurisdictionsm by holding that, although the
professional degree is not marital property subject to division, the
equitable distribution statute is broad enough to consider the in-
creased earning capacity in deciding an equitable award of ali-
mony.'" In addition, the court observed that the trial judge's award-
ing of money to the supporting spouse for rehabilitation was not
an abuse of discretion.' 95 The court noted that because Celia had
postponed her own professional plans, the judge properly awarded
her at least $60,000 over five years in order to rehabilitate her
skills.' 06 The Drapek decision shows that although Massachusetts is
unwilling to qualify a professional degree as a marital asset, it is
Drapek, 399 Mass. at 244, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
99 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 245, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
101 Id.
109 Id. at 246, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
'"' See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority view.
1 °1 Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 246, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1987).
100 Id. at 248, 503 N.E.2d at 951.
n'o See id.
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willing to compensate the supporting spouse through a combination
of alimony and rehabilitation payments.'° 7
B. Other Recent Cases
In a 1988 case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
ruled on the issue of spousal interest in a professional degree for
the first time. As previously mentioned, the court determined, in
Hoak v. Hoak, that a professional degree or license was not marital
property but a supporting spouse should receive, in some circum-
stances, reimbursement alimony and possibly rehabilitative ali-
mony.'" The Hoaks married in August of 1980, just after Bruce
Hoak completed his first year of medical school.'" Rebecca Hoak
had received a Bachelor degree in horticulture and had changed
jobs a year later in order to make more money. She had planned
to return to school for a degree in either education or accounting
after Bruce had completed his medical training. Bruce admitted
that his wife provided the majority of support, both financially and
with regard to homemaking services, for the years 1980-1982.
After Bruce's graduation from medical school in 1983, he
started a five year surgical residency in Charleston, West Virginia
and from then on provided the primary support for the couple.
The marriage dissolved when the parties separated in September
of 1984. Bruce filed for divorce in October of 1984. In August of
1986, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County dissolved the marriage
and awarded Rebecca $250 per month in child support, plus the
child's medical and dental expenses, $500 per month in rehabilita-
tive alimony for two years, and $1,875 in attorney's fees. Rebecca
Hoak petitioned the ,Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
alleging that the circuit court had erred in failing to hold that
Bruce's medical license constituted marital property."°
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the
medical degree was not marital property and adopted instead the
concept of reimbursement alimony to compensate a supporting
spouse."' By ruling that the professional degree was not marital
See id.
'" Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 474 (W. Va. 1988).
'°9 Id.
"° Id. at 475.
"' Id. at 474.
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property, the court adopted the viewpoint of the majority of high
courts deciding this issue." 2
 The court held that determining the
value of a professional degree involved too much speculation and
that the characterization of a spouse's contribution to the other as
an investment "demeans the concept of marriage."" 3
In addition, the Hoak court noted that a professional degree
does not fall within the statutory definition of marital property
because it represents money earned after the marriage has dissolved
and not during. 114
 The court also noted that a degree results from
the efforts of the student spouse and that, although financial and
emotional support are helpful, they have no relation to the value
of the degree. 115 As the court stated:
[I]f we place a value on homemaker services in arriving
at a fair ratio for distributing the value of the degree,
should we also "pay" the student for his or contributions
in the way of long hours in the lab and the library? And,
to the same point, how much of a medical degree is attri-
butable to the actual years spent in medical school, as
opposed to undergraduate courses in biology and chem-
istry, or other life experiences that contribute to making
a good doctor?"'
In spite of the Hoak court's obvious skepticism of the notion of
dividing up the degree as property, it did observe that to deny the
supporting spouse compensation would be grossly unfair.[" The
court chose "reimbursement alimony" as a means for that compen-
sation, noting that because reimbursement alimony is based on the
actual contribution made, it does not involve a judge's speculation
as to the future earnings of the degree holder, inflation, or the
relative values of the spouses' contributions." 8
 The Hoak court,
however, cautioned that reimbursement, as a rule, is neither desir-
able nor practical but should be used only when an unfairness has
occurred.' 19
 The court then left the decision of what method to use
12 M. at 475.
"'Id. at 476.
14 Id. at 477 (thing W. VA. CODE § 48-2—I(e)( I) (1986)).
115 1d.
15 1d. at 477 n.4.
117 Id.
11 8 Id. at 474, 477.
19 Id. at 478. The court noted that a judge may:
in an appropriate case award reimbursment alimony to a working spouse who
contributed financially to the professional education of a student spouse, where
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in determining the amount of reimbursement to the discretion of
the trial court.' 2°
On the subject of rehabilitative alimony, the Hoak court ruled
that this measure may be appropriate when a supporting spouse
has delayed his or her education or professional career. 12 ' The court
concluded that in cases in which the working spouse had supported
the family while the student obtained the degree, and postponed
his or her return to school to seek a degree, both reimbursement
and rehabilitative alimony might have been in order.' 22
The Court of Appeals of Utah, in the 1988 case of Martinez v.
Martinez, also determined that a medical degree was not property
subject to valuation and distribution upon dissolution of a mar-
riage.' 23 In Martinez, the couple had been . married for seventeen
years and had three children.'" At the time of marriage, each
spouse had only a high school education.' 25 The court noted that
although the couple had been married for a long time, they had
not acquired a significant amount of property during the marriage
that would compensate the supporting spouse.' 26
The Martinez court concluded that equity demands recognition
of the contributions the supporting spouse makes to a student
spouse's professional degree.'" These contributions, the court
noted, are not restricted to financial support, but also might be in
the form of homemaking services.' 28 The court said that to hold
that the only value is the monetary income generated by the sup-
porting spouse would, in effect, be saying "that the functions of
mother, homemaker, and helpmate contribute nothing to the value
of the family." 129 Notably, the Martinez court put forth a list of
factors to be analyzed in deciding the amount of an award of
equitable restitution.'" These guidelines included, but were not
the contribution was made with the expectation of achieving a higher standard
of living for the family unit, and the couple did not realize that expectation due
to divorce.
Id. at 477.
"I' Id. at 479.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 478, 479.
1 " 754 P.2d 69, 75 (Utah App. 1988).
124 Id. at 70.
129 Id.
126 1d. at 75.
127 Id. at 76.
128 .See id. at 77.
129 Id. See also St.-Pierre v. St.-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984).
130 Martinez, 754 P.2d at 78.
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limited to, the length of the marriage, the monetary contributions
and personal sacrifices made by the requesting spouse, how long
these contributions and sacrifices lasted during the marriage, the
resulting difference in earning capacity between the requesting
spouse and the professional spouse, and the amount of property
accumulated during the marriage."'
III. SOLVING THE COMPENSATION PROBLEM
In O'Brien v. O'Brien, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the professional degree is property that courts should divide upon
divorce. The O'Brien court based its holding on the notion that
marriage is a partnership and that each spouse has a property right
in assets accumulated during the marriagein In contrast, the ma-
jority of courts' determination that the degree is not divisible marital
property may reflect the modern trend toward increased individual
autonomy and independence within the marital relationship.'" In
recognizing that a professional degree is an academic achievement
obtained through the efforts of an individual spouse, courts are
making decisions in accordance with the "new" model of marriage
and property based on the notion of individual spouses autono-
mously acting for their own self-realization independent of the
marital relationship.' 34
In Drapek, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressed
the majority viewpoint by deciding that although the degree is not
marital property, the supporting spouse is entitled to compensation
through alimony and possibly rehabilitation payments.'" The court
was correct in determining that a professional degree or increased
earning capacity are not marital assets subject to distribution upon
dissolution of the marriage. The court's analysis on this issue is
correct for several reasons. First, for the court to have held that the
medical degree was part of the husband's estate under Massachu-
setts General Laws, chapter 208, section 34 would have involved
too much speculation on the part of the trier of fact. In addition,
the court would not be able to modify the award based on future
events affecting the professional's earning capacity. 136 The
"'Id.
02 See supra note 51 and accompanying text for a similar point about marriage as a
partnership.
"3 M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 11 (1981).
14 Id. at 138.
's' See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Drapek decision.
' 36 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 498, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982).
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mere fact that a person is qualified to practice a profession does
not definitively determine that he or she will indeed practice it and
earn a certain income.'" Too many unforeseen events may interfere
with that alleged future earning potential.' 38 By awarding a portion
of the value of the degree as property, the court is awarding a final
remedy that may be unfair if the speculated future wealth does not
materialize.' 39
Second, the degree has none of the characteristics of property
and is in effect simply a recognition of accomplishment on the part
of the student spouse."° A professional degree reflects the obtain-
ment of knowledge by an individual. It is not strictly an economic
investment that can be bought and sold at will. The degree is
obtained solely and individually through the efforts of the student
spouse. Although the other spouse may have provided the means,
either financial, emotional, or both, the actual work and achieve-
ment are performed by the student spouse.
Third, as the majority in Hoak pointed out, the division of the
degree based on the future earnings of the average professional
may enslave a young professional to a specialty or career path he
or she might not otherwise have chosen."' The obligation to pay
half of what an average young lawyer earns may force the profes-
sional into, for instance, staying at a large firm where salaries are
top dollar, rather than opting for a career as a public defender. Or,
perhaps even more unfairly, it may force a professional into staying
in a profession he or she neither likes nor is good at, simply to be
able to make the assigned payments.
Finally, to decide that a professional degree is "property" is, in
effect, making it seem as if a professional degree can be "purchased"
for a specified sum of money. 142 It entirely ignores that the degree
is obtained not solely through the income contributed by the sup-
porting spouse, but mostly through the sacrifice and perseverance
of the student. In Hoak, the court facetiously, yet justifiably, noted
that in determining the equitable portion of the value of the degree
to go to each spouse, the court would then have to tally up the
many hours that the student spent in the library or laboratory. 143
Id.
' 38 1d.
' 39 Id.
10 See supra note 16 for a discussion of the nonproperty characteristics of an educational
degree.
"' Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 476 (W. Va. 1988).
"8 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
13 Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 477 n.4.
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Among the arguments made in favor of evaluating the degree
and apportioning it between the spouses is that the supporting
spouse has "invested" in the degree in the expectation that he or
she will later enjoy a higher standard of living.'" This argument
diminishes the institution of marriage to a cold, hard business re-
lationship and the academic endeavor of obtaining a professional
degree to nothing more than a financial investment. As the Hoak
court so aptly characterized the issue, "[m]arriage is not a business
arrangement, and this [c]ourt would be loathe to promote any more
tallying of respective debits and credits than already occurs in the
average household."'" In addition, the simple fact that the divorce
has frustrated the supporting spouse's expectations is not grounds
for dividing up the degree. There has been a divorce! Along with
that necessarily comes a host of frustrated expectations, both finan-
cial and emotional.
On the other hand, the supporting spouse should not go un-
compensated.'" The supporting spouse has stuck by the student
and provided emotional, financial and domestic support throughout
the marriage. Reimbursement is the proper means by which to
provide this compensation. However, the alimony system is not the
proper vehicle through which to reimburse a contributing spouse.
The concepts of reimbursement and alimony are contradictory and
inapposite.' 47
 Alimony is based on the needs of the spouse seeking
it and is also a reflection of the standard of living set during the
marriage. Reimbursement, on the other hand, should be compen-
sation to the supporting spouse completely separate from any pay-
ments received through the alimony system.
The supporting spouse should be reimbursed, but not through
the alimony system. Because alimony is terminated upon death or
remarriage, this system, as the O'Brien court pointed out, may force
the spouse to choose between remarriage or claiming the money to
which he or she is entitled.'" In some instances, this may result in
the supporting spouse never receiving the reimbursement he or she
so much deserves. Courts should, instead, award the nonstudent
spouse a reimbursement amount payable either in a lump sum or
144
 Olar v. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo. 1987).
145 Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 478.
Na Id.
147 See supra note 40 and accompanying text for a similar point about alimony and
reimbursement.
' 4" O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 587, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748
(1985).
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on a payment schedule, separate from the alimony award, depend-
ing on the specific facts of the case. In addition, unlike alimony, the
payments would not terminate upon death or remarriage.
For reimbursement, the supporting spouse should receive the
present value of the support expended. The support could include
financial or homemaking services. In Martinez, the Utah Court of
Appeals set forth some helpful guidelines that courts may use to
determine an appropriate reimbursement award.' 49 These factors
will provide at least some guidance and uniformity to what must,
necessarily, be determined on a case-by-case basis.
If a supporting spouse has postponed his or her educational
or career goals solely for the purpose of allowing the student spouse
to obtain his or her degree, the Hoak court correctly determined
that rehabilitative payments, possibly in the form of alimony, may
be appropriate to compensate a spouse for lost opportunity. 15°
Courts should, however, be cautious in the amount and way they
award this. A strong showing of proof on the part of the supporting
spouse should be mandatory, and the spouse should then be re-
quired to take immediate steps toward rehabilitation. If these steps
are in the form of schooling, training programs or the like, the
professional spouse should provide a portion of the tuition pay-
ments in an amount that the trier of fact deems equitable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many problems arise in determining a fair and equitable prop-
erty settlement upon divorce. The situation in which a spouse has
worked to support a mate who is pursuing a professional degree,
with divorce following closely on the heels of graduation, presents
a complicated dissolution problem. The couple rarely has any note-
worthy assets, and the sacrifices of the supporting spouse are in
danger of going uncompensated. Although the supporting spouse
often has postponed his or her own career or educational goals for
the attainment of the spouse's degree, the professional spouse has
presumably achieved his or her educational goals.
Courts have attempted to remedy the situation in a variety of
ways. The majority of courts have determined that the degree is
not marital property per se, but the supporting spouse should be
149 Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Im See supra note 122 and accompanying text for a discussion of alimony payments to
spouses who postpone educational goals.
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compensated for his or her contribution through either the tradi-
tional alimony system, a reimbursment sum or possibly a rehabili-
tation award. A minority of courts have determined that the degree
is marital property subject to distribution, and the supporting
spouse should be compensated by receiving a portion of the value
of the degree in the form of the future earning capacity of the
holder.
The most equitable solution to the problem is to recognize that
the degree is 'not marital property, as it has none of the character-
istics of "property," but instead, is simply an academic achievement
of the degree holder. The court should then compensate the sup-
porting spouse by awarding a reimbursement award, payable in
either a lump sum or on a schedule, consisting of the present value
of the support contributed. This reimbursement payment should
exist independently of any alimony award. In addition, if the sup-
porting spouse has suffered from the postponement of career or
education, an award for rehabilitation may be in order.
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